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Abstract
Constrained competitive optimization involves multiple agents trying to minimize
conflicting objectives, subject to constraints. This is a highly expressive modeling
language that subsumes most of modern machine learning. In this work we propose
competitive mirror descent (CMD): a general method for solving such problems
based on first order information that can be obtained by automatic differentiation.
First, by adding Lagrange multipliers, we obtain a simplified constraint set with
an associated Bregman potential. At each iteration, we then solve for the Nash
equilibrium of a regularized bilinear approximation of the full problem to obtain
a direction of movement of the agents. Finally, we obtain the next iterate by
following this direction according to the dual geometry induced by the Bregman
potential. By using the dual geometry we obtain feasible iterates despite only
solving a linear system at each iteration, eliminating the need for projection steps
while still accounting for the global nonlinear structure of the constraint set. As
a special case we obtain a novel competitive multiplicative weights algorithm for
problems on the positive cone.
1 Introduction
Constrained competitive optimization: Machine learning replaces domain-specific modeling by
using training data to pick the best performing procedure from a large class of candidates. This is
usually done by solving a large unconstrained optimization problem using first order information
obtained from automatic differentiation, which we refer to as training.
Recently, there has been a surge in attempts at introducing structure into machine learning models
in order to improve accuracy, reliability, and robustness. This structure may come from physical
laws [1, 2, 3, 4], safety requirements or optimality conditions in reinforcement learning [5, 6, 7], or
fairness requirements [8, 9, 10]. Imposing constraints during training provides a flexible and modular
framework to incorporate these requirements.
Another active area of research is to replace the training problem by a competitive optimization
problem where two agents are optimizing their own objective, in competition with each other. This
approach has been successfully applied to adversarial robustness [11] and generative modeling [12].
Together, this yields constrained competitive optimization of the general form
min
x∈C,
f̃(x)∈C̃
f(x, y), min
y∈K,
g̃(y)∈K̃
g(x, y). (1)
The goal of this work is to provide a general purpose algorithm for solving constrained competitive
problems, as a counterpart of gradient descent in unconstrained single-agent optimization.
Constraints and competition: At a closer look, constraints and competition are closely related.
In the special case of equality constraints we can use a Lagrange multiplier λ to turn a constrained
minimization problem into an unconstrained minimax problem
min
x: g(x)=0
f(x) ⇔ min
x
max
λ
f(x) + λg(x).
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Figure 1: The local approxima-
tion (coarse mesh) of the con-
strained minimax problem (fine
mesh) is unconstrained. Thus,
y chooses its move assuming x
to turn negative. After x is pro-
jected back to the feasible set,
this move of y is suboptimal.
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Figure 2: Squared distance
(fine mesh) and KL divergence
(coarse mesh) to the point (1, 1).
The KL divergence increases
sharply as (x, y) approaches the
boundary of the positive orthant.
Figure 3: The dual notion
of straight line induced by the
Shannon entropy guarantees fea-
sible iterates on Rm+ .
By simultaneously optimizing over x and λ we obtain an unconstrained competitive optimization
problem that approximates the original constrained problem and, under certain conditions, recovers it.
Thus, any method for competitive optimization can immediately be applied to equality constrained
competitive problems.
Competitive gradient descent (CGD): The simplest approach to solving a minmax problem is
simultaneous gradient descent (SimGD), where both players perform a step of gradient descent (ascent
for the dual player) at each iteration. However, this algorithm has poor performance in practice and
diverges even on simple problems. The authors of [13] argue that the poor performance of SimGD
comes from the fact that the updates of the two players are computed without interactive nature of
the game into account. They propose to instead compute the updates of both players as the Nash
equilibrium of a local bilinear approximation of the original game, regularized with a quadratic penalty
that models the limited confidence of both players in the approximation’s accuracy. The resulting
algorithm, competitive gradient descent (CGD), is shown to have improved convergence properties,
making it a promising candidate for solving constrained competitive optimization problems.
CGD and inequality constraints: While Lagrange multipliers can eliminate equality constraints,
they can merely simplify inequality constraints, as
min
x: h(x)≤0
f(x) ⇔ min
x
max
µ≥0
f(x) + µh(x).
In general, Lagrangian duality can replace a nonlinear conic constraint h(x) ∈ C with a linear
constraint on the polar cone λ ∈ C◦ := {y : supx∈C x>y ≤ 0}. Thus, applying CGD to conically
constrained optimization requires a version of CGD that can handle linear conic constraints. The
simplest approach to extend CGD to conic constraints is to interleave its updates with projections
onto the constraint set, obtaining projected gradient descent (PCGD). But this algorithm converges to
suboptimal points even in convex examples due to a phenomenon that we call empty threats. Empty
threats arise when a player can improve its loss in the local approximation by violating the constraints.
Anticipating this action, which is ultimately prevented by the projection step, the other player deviates
from the optimal strategy, preventing PCGD from converging to the optimal solution (c.f. Figure 1).
Mirror descent: The fundamental reason for the empty threats-phenomenon observed in projected
CGD is that the local update rule of CGD does not include any information about the global structure
of the constraint set. The mirror descent framework [14] uses a Bregman potential ψ to obtain a
local update rule that takes the global geometry of the constraint set into account. It computes the
next iterate xk+1 as the minimizer of a linear approximation of the objective, regularized with the
Bregman divergence Dψ(xk+1 ‖ xk) associated to ψ. For problems on the positive orthant Rm+ , we
2
can ensure feasible iterates by choosing ψ as the Shannon entropy, obtaining an algorithm known as
entropic mirror descent, exponentiated gradient descent, or multiplicative weights algorithm. A naive
extension of mirror descent to the competitive setting simply replaces the quadratic regularization in
SimGD or CGD with a Bregman divergence. However, the former inherits the cycling problem of
SimGD, while the later requires solving a nonlinear problem at each iteration.
Algorithm 1 Competitive multiplicative weights (CMW)1
1: for 0 ≤ k < N do
2: ∆x = −
(
diagxk −
[
D2xyf
]
diag−1yk
[
D2yxg
])−1 (
[∇xf ]−
[
D2xyf
]
diag−1yk [∇yg]
)
3: ∆y = −
(
diagyk −
[
D2yxg
]
diag−1xk
[
D2xyf
])−1 (
[∇xg]−
[
D2yxg
]
diag−1xk [∇xf ]
)
4: xk+1 = xk exp (∆x)
5: yk+1 = yk exp (∆y)
6: end for
7: return xN , yN
Our contributions: In this work, we propose competitive mirror descent (CMD), a novel algorithm
that combines the ideas of CMD and mirror descent in a computationally efficient way. In the
special case where the Bregman potential is the Shannon entropy, our algorithm computes the Nash-
equilibrium of a regularized bilinear approximation and uses it for a multiplicative update. The
resulting competitive multiplicative weights (CMW, Algorithm 1) is a competitive extension of the
multiplicative weights update rule that accounts for the interaction between the two players
More generally, our method is based on the geometric interpretation of mirror descent proposed by
[15]. From this point of view, mirror descent solves a quadratic local problem in order to obtain a
direction of movement. The next iterate is then obtained by moving into this direction for a unit time
interval. Crucially, this notion of moving into a direction is not derived from the Euclidean structure
of the constraint set, but from the dual geometry defined by the Bregman potential. In the case of the
Shannon entropy, this amounts to moving on straight lines in logarithmic coordinates, resulting in
multiplicative updates (see Figure 3). This formulation is extended to CGD by letting both agents
choose a direction of movement according to a local bilinear approximation of the original problem
and then using the dual geometry of the Bregman potential to derive the next iterate. The resulting
competitive mirror descent (CMD, Algorithm 2) combines the computational efficiency of CGD with
the ability to use general Bregman potentials to account for the nonlinear structure of the constraints.
Algorithm 2 Competitive mirror descent (CMD) for general Bregman potentials ψ and φ.
1: for 0 ≤ k < N do
2: ∆x = −
([
D2ψ
]
−
[
D2xyf
] [
D2φ
]−1 [
D2yxg
])−1 (
[∇xf ]−
[
D2xyf
] [
D2φ
]−1
[∇yg]
)
3: ∆y = −
([
D2φ
]
−
[
D2yxg
] [
D2ψ
]−1 [
D2xyf
])−1 (
[∇xg]−
[
D2yxg
] [
D2ψ
]−1
[∇xf ]
)
4: xk+1 = (∇ψ)−1 ([∇ψ(x)] + ∆x)
5: yk+1 = (∇φ)−1 ([∇φ(y)] + ∆y)
6: end for
7: return xN , yN
2 Simplifying constraints by duality
Constrained competitive optimization: The most general class of problems that we are concerned
with is of the form of Equation (1) where C ⊂ Rm,K ∈ Rn are convex sets, f̃ : C −→ Rñ and
g̃ : K −→ Rm̃ are continuous and piecewise differentiable multivariate functions of the two agents’
decision variables x and y and C̃, K̃ are closed convex cones. This framework is extremely general
and by choosing suitable functions f̃ , g̃ and convex cones C̃, K̃ it can implement a variety of nonlinear
1Here, exp is applied element-wise and diagz denotes the diagonal matrix with entries given by the vector z.
∇xf, [D2xyf ],∇yg, [D2yxg] denote the gradients and mixed Hessians of f and g, evaluated in (xk, yk).
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equality, inequality, and positive-definiteness constraints. While there are many ways in which a
problem can be cast into the above form, we are interested in the case where the f, f̃ , g, g̃ are allowed
to be complicated, for instance given in terms of neural networks, while the C̃, K̃ are simple and
well-understood. For convex constraints and objectives f and g the canonical solution concept is a
Nash equilibrium, a pair of feasible strategies (x̄, ȳ) such that x̄ (ȳ) is the optimal strategy for x (y)
given y = ȳ (x = x̄). In the non-convex case it is less clear what should constitute a solution and it
has been argued [16] that meaningful solutions need not even be local Nash equilibria.
Lagrange multipliers lead to linear constraints: Using the classical technique of Lagrangian
duality, the complicated parameterization f, f̃ , g, g̃ and the simple constraints given by the C̃, K̃ can
be further decoupled. The polar of a convex cone K is defined as K◦ :=
{
y : supx∈K x
>y ≤ 0
}
.
Using this definition, we can rewrite Problem (1) as
min
x∈C,
µ∈K̃◦
f(x, y) + max
ν∈C̃◦
ν>f̃(x), min
y∈K,
ν∈C̃◦
g(x, y) + max
µ∈K̃◦
µ>g(y). (2)
Here we used the fact that the maxima are infinity if any constraint is violated and zero, otherwise.
Watchmen watching watchmen: We can now attempt to simplify the problem by making µj (νi)
decision variables of the y (x) player and adding a zero sum objective to the game that incentivizes
both players to enforce each other’s compliance with the constraints, resulting in
min
x∈C,
µ∈K̃◦
f(x, y) + ν>f̃(x)− µ>g̃(y), min
y∈K,
ν∈C◦
g(x, y) + µ>g̃(y)− ν>f̃(x). (3)
If Problem 1 is convex and strictly feasible (Slater’s condition), its Nash equilibria are equal to those
of Problem 3 (see supplementary material for details).
A simplified problem: While this is not true in general, we propose to use Problem 3 as a more
tractable approximation of Problem 1. In the following, we assume that the nonlinear constraints of
the problem have already been eliminated, leaving us (for possible different C and K) with
min
x∈C
f(x, y), min
y∈K
g(x, y). (4)
3 Projected competitive gradient descent suffers from empty threats
Competitive gradient descent (CGD): [13] propose to solve unconstrained competitive optimiza-
tion problems by choosing iterates (xk+1, yk+1) as Nash equilibria of a quadratically regularized
bilinear approximation
xk+1 = xk+ argmin
x∈Rm
[Dxf ]x+ y
> [Dyxf ]x+ [Dyf ] y +
x>x
2η
yk+1 = yk+ argmin
y∈Rn
[Dxg]x+ x
> [Dxyg] y + [Dyg] y +
y>y
2η
,
(5)
where f, g : Rm × Rn −→ R are the loss functions of the two agents and [Dxf ], [Dxg], [Dyf ],
[Dyg], [Dyxf ], and [Dxyg] their (mixed) derivatives evaluated in the last iterate (xk, yk).
A simple minmax game: We will use the following simple example to illustrate the difficulties
when dealing with inequality constraints.
min
x∈R
2xy − (1− y)2 min
y∈R
−2xy + (1− y)2.
When applying CGD to this example, it finds the (unique) Nash-equilibrium (x, y) = (−1, 0).
Adding positivity constraints: Let us now assume that x and y are constrained to be positive
min
x∈R+
2xy − (1− y)2 min
y∈R+
−2xy + (1− y)2. (6)
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C Potential ψ(p) [Dψ(p)]x x>
[
D2ψ(p)
]
x Divergence Dψ(p ‖ q)
Rm p
>A p
2 , A ∈ H
m×m
+ p
>Ax x>Ax (p−q)
>A (p−q)
2
Rm+
∑
i
pi log(pi)− pi
∑
i
log(pi)xi
∑
i
x2i
pi
∑
i
(
pi log(
pi
qi
)− pi + qi
)
Rm+
∑
i
− log(pi) −
∑
i
xi
pi
∑
i
x2i
p2i
∑
i
(
pi
qi
− log
(
pi
qi
)
− 1
)
Hm+ − logdet(p) tr
[
p−1x
]
tr
[
xp−1p−1x
]
tr [p/q − Id]− logdet(p/q)
Table 1: Some Bregman potentials, their domains, derivatives, and Bregman divergences.
x
y
(0, 0)
(0, 23 )
min
y
−2xy + (y − 1)2
Figure 4: Since x ≥ 0, the bi-
linear term should only lead to y
picking a larger value. But CGD
is oblivious to the constraint and
y decreases in anticipation of x
turning negative.
It is easy to see that for any y ≥ 0 the best strategy of the x-
player is x = 0. Given x = 0 the best strategy for the y-player
is y = 1, leaving us with the Nash-equilibrium (x, y) = (0, 1).
How do we incorporate the positivity constraints into CGD? The
simplest approach is to combine CGD with projections onto the
constraint set, which we call projected competitive gradient de-
scent (PCGD). Here, we compute the updates of CGD as per
usual but after each update we project back onto the constraint
set through (x, y) 7→ (max(0, x),max(0, y)). This generalizes
projected gradient descent, a popular and simple method in con-
strained optimization with proven convergence properties [17].
PCGD and empty threats: Applying PCGD (with η = 0.25) to
our example, we see that it converges instead to (x, y) = (0, 2/3),
which is suboptimal for the y-player! Since problem (6) is a con-
vex game, any sensible algorithm should converge to the unique
Nash-equilibrium, making this a failure case for PCGD.
The explanation of this behavior lies in the conflicting rules of the
unconstrained local game 5 and the constrained global game 6.
The local game of Equation (5) in the point (0, 2/3) is given by
min
x
4x
3
+ 2xy +
2y
3
+ 2x2, min
y
−4x
3
− 2xy − 2y
3
+ 2y2
If x were to stay in zero, the optimal strategy for y under the local game would be y = 1/6, moving
it towards 1, the global optimum. However, the local game does not have constraints, incentivizing x
to turn negative. This is an empty threat in that it violates the constraints and will therefore be undone
by the projection step. However, this information is not included in the local game and the outlook
of x becoming negative deters y from moving towards the optimal strategy of y = 1 (c.f. Figure 4).
We note that this problem is generic for projected versions of algorithms featuring competitive terms
involving the mixed Hessian. Since [13] identify these terms as crucial for convergence, this is a
major obstacle for constrained competitive optimization.
4 Mirror descent and Bregman potentials
Bregman potentials: The underlying reason for the empty threats-phenomenon described in the
last section is that a local method such as CGD has no way on knowing how close it is to the boundary
of the constraint set. In single-agent optimization this problem has been addressed by the use of
Bregman potentials or Barrier functions.
Definition 1. We call a strictly convex and two-times differentiable function ψ : C −→ R a Bregman
potential on the convex domain C.
In Figure 1 we have shown some popular Bregman potentials and their respective domains. For
the purposes of this work, a Bregman potential ψ on C is best understood as quantifying how close
different points y ∈ C are from argminψ, which we think of as the center of C. Importantly, the
notion of distance induced by ψ is anisotropic, and usually increases rapidly as y approaches the
boundary of the domain. In particular, derivative information of ψ at a point p allows us to infer
its position relative to the boundary of C, allowing a local algorithm to take into account the global
structure of the constraint set.
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Bregman divergences: Associated with a Bregman potential ψ(·) on a domain C is the Bregman
divergence Dψ(· ‖ ·) that allows us to extend the notion of distance between y and argminψ given
by ψ to a notion of distance between arbitrary elements of C.
Definition 2. The Bregman divergence associated to the potential ψ is defined as
Dψ(p ‖ q) := ψ(p)− ψ(q)− [∇ψ(q)](p− q). (7)
Just like a squared distance, Dψ(p ‖ q) is convex, positive, and achieves its minimum of zero if and
only if p = q. However, it is not symmetric in the sense that Dψ(p ‖ q) 6= Dψ(q ‖ p), in general.
Crucially, a Bregman divergence will in general not be translation invariant and can therefore take the
position relative to the boundary of C into account.
Mirror Descent: Mirror descent [14] uses a Bregman to improve gradient descent by the following
update rule.
xk+1 = argmin
x
[Df (xk)] (x− xk) + Dψ(x ‖ xk). (8)
By solving for the first order optimality conditions, the update can be computed in closed form as
xk+1 = (Dψ)
−1
([Dψ (xk)]− [Df (xk)]) , (9)
where (Dψ)−1 (y) is defined as the point x ∈ C such that [Dψ(x)] = y. By strict convexity of ψ, if
(Dψ)
−1
(y) exists it is unique. In this case, (Dψ)−1 (y) is contained in C which ensures that mirror
descent satisfies the constraints without an additional projection step.
Definition 3. A Bregman potential ψ is complete on C if the map Dψ : C −→ R1×m is surjective.
If ψ is complete, the mirror descent update is well-defined for all gradients. From this point of view,
the necessity for a projection step in inequality constrained gradient descent arises from the potential
ψ(x) = x>x/2 not being complete on the constraint set C. A popular choice of potential that is
complete on the positive orthant Rm+ is the Shannon entropy ψ(x)
∑
i xi log (xi)− xi resulting in
entropic mirror descent
xk+1 = exp
(
log (xk)− [Df (xk)]>
)
= xk exp
(
[Df (xk)]
>
)
. (10)
Here, multiplication, exponentiation, and logarithms are defined component-wise.
Naive competitive mirror descent: A possible generalization of mirror descent to Problem (4) is
xk+1 = argmin
x∈Rm
[Dxf ] (x− xk) + (y − yk)> [Dyxf ] (x− xk) + [Dyf ] (y − yk) + Dψ(x ‖ xk)
yk+1 = argmin
y∈Rn
[Dxg] (x− xk) + (x− xk)> [Dxyg] (y − yk) + [Dyg] (y − yk) + Dφ(y ‖ yk),
where ψ and φ are complete Bregman potentials on C and K, respectively. However, the local game
in this update rule does not have a closed form solution as in mirror descent or competitive gradient
descent. Instead, it requires us to solve a nonlinear competitive optimization problem at each step.
While it is possible to alternatingly solve for the two players’ strategies until convergence, this will be
significantly slower than the Krylov subspace methods employed to solve system of linear equations
in the original CGD [13]. In order to avoid this overhead, we will now develop an alternative
competitive generalization of mirror descent rooted in its information-geometric interpretation.
5 The information geometry of Bregman divergences
Reminder on differential geometry: To present the material in this chapter, we briefly review the
following basic notions of differential geometry.
Definition 4 (Submanifold of Rm). M ⊂ Rm is a k-dimensional smooth submanifold of Rm if
for every point p ∈ M there exists an open ball B(p) centered at p and a smooth function Gp :
B(p) −→ Rm−k, such that the rank of the Jacobian of Gp is k everywhere andM∩Bp = G−1(0).
We can think of a smooth submanifold as a (possible curved) surface in Rm.
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Definition 5 (Tangent space). The tangent space TpM of a k-dimensional submanifoldM of Rm in
p is given by the null space of the Jacobian of Gp in p. Here, Gp is chosen as in Definition 4.
To a creature living onM, the elements of the tangent space in p ∈M correspond to the velocities
with which it could depart from p.
Definition 6 (Riemannian metric). A Riemannian metric is a map p 7→ gp(·, ·) that assigns to each
p ∈M an inner product on TpM.
If the elements x ∈ TpM of the tangent space are velocities, gp (x, x) is their (squared) speed. It
allows us to compare the magnitude or significance of moving in different velocities.
Definition 7 (Exponential map). An exponential map is a collection
{
Expp : TpM−→M
}
p∈M
that satisfies
Expp ((t+ s)x) = Expq (sy) , for q = Expp(tx), y =
d
dr
Expp (rx))
∣∣
r=t
.
Figure 5: A manifoldM, tangent space
TpM, tangent vector x ∈ TpM, and the
path described by the exponential map{
q : q = Expp(tx), for t ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
The exponential map Expp(x) returns the destination
reached when walking straight in the velocity x for a
unit time interval, starting in p.
The geometry of Bregman potentials: We will now
explain how a Bregman potential equips its domain C with
a geometric structure (see [18, 19] for details). Our man-
ifoldM will simply be the interior of C ⊂ Rm with TpM
given by Rm for all p ∈M (without loss of generality, we
assume that int C has full dimension). The Riemannian
metric gψ associated with the potential ψ is given by
gψp (x, x) =
x>
[
D2xxψ (p)
]
x
2
=
d2
2 dr2
Dψ(p+ rx ‖ p).
Following the interpretation of the Bregman divergence as
a notion of squared distance, the metric gψp measures how
quickly a given velocity x ∈ TpM will take us away from
p, according to this notion of distance.
The dual exponential map: A key feature of Bregman
potentials is that they induce a new exponential map on the manifold C. M is an open subset of
Rm and thus a restriction of the Euclidean exponential map Expp (x) := p + x to p ∈ M is an
exponential map onM, which we call the primal exponential map. However, a Bregman potential ψ
also induces a dual exponential map onM, given by
Expψp (x) = (Dψ)
(
(Dψ)
−1
+
[
D2ψ (p)
]
x
)
In the special case of C = Rm+ and ψ(x) =
∑
i xi log(xi) − xi given by the Shannon entropy, the
dual exponential map is given by(
Expψp (x)
)
i
= exp
(
log(pi) +
xi
pi
)
= pi exp
(
xi
pi
)
.
Thus, while the primal straight lines t 7→ Expx (tx) have constant additive rate of change, dual
straight lines have constant t 7→ Expx (tx) have constant relative rate of change.
An important property of the dual exponential map it that it inherits the completeness property of ψ.
Lemma 1. If the potential ψ is complete with respect to M, the dual exponential map Expψ is
complete in the sense that
∀p ∈M,∀x ∈ Rm : Expψp (x) ∈M. (11)
Thus, a complete potential ψ provides us with way of following a direction x ∈ TpM inM = int C
that ensures that we never accidentally leave the feasible set. We will now recast mirror descent in
terms of the dual geometry induced by ψ.
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6 Competitive mirror descent
In [15], it is observed that mirror descent has a natural formulation in terms of the dual geometry
induced by ψ. Namely, its updates can be expressed as
1. Choose a direction of movement that minimizes a linear local approximation, regularized with
the metric induced by ψ.
∆x = argmin
x∈TxkM
[Dxf ]x+
1
2
xT
[
D2ψ(xk)
]
x
2. Compute xk+1 by moving into this direction, according to the dual geometry of ψ.
xk+1 = Exp
ψ
xk
(∆x)
For ψ (φ) a complete Bregman divergence on C (K), this form of mirror descent can be readily
extended to Problem (4), resulting in competitive mirror descent (CMD):
1. Solve for a local Nash equilibrium where both players try to minimize the bilinear local approxi-
mation of their objective, regularized with the metrics induced by ψ and φ.
∆x = argmin
x∈TxkC
[Dxf ]x+ x
> [D2xyf] y + [Dyf ] y + 12x> [D2ψ]x
∆y = argmin
y∈TykK
[Dxg]x+ x
> [D2xyg] y + [Dyg] y + 12y> [D2φ] y
2. Compute xk+1 (yk+1) by moving into this direction according to the dual geometries of ψ (φ).
xk+1 = Exp
ψC
xk
(∆x) , yk+1 = Exp
φ
yk
(∆y)
Since ψ and φ are complete, each iterate is guaranteed to be feasible, while the local game (5) is
quadratic and can be solved in closed form, resulting in algorithm 2.
7 Numerical implementation and experiments
Figure 6: CMW and PX applied to
f(x, y) = α(x − 0.1)(y − 0.1) =
−g(x, y) (α ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.9, 2.7}).
For small α, PX converges faster but
for large α it diverges.
We defer the discussion of numerical implementation and
numerical experiments to the supplementary material, noting
that as discussed in [13, 16], the matrix inverse in CMD does
not prevent it from scaling to large problems.
As discussed in [13][Section 3], the competitive term involv-
ing the mixed Hessian D2xyf,D
2
yxg is crucial to ensure con-
vergence for bilinear problems. Most methods that include a
competitive term such as [20, 21, 22, 23] encounter the empty
threats-phenomenon described in Section 3 when combined
with a projection. A notable exception is the projected extra-
gradient method (PX) [24](see also [25][Chapter 12]) which
we therefore see as the main competitor to CMD. The main
practical advantage of CMD over the projected extragradient
method is that just as CGD, it can handle strong interactions
between the two players (large D2xyf,D
2
yxg), without needing
to reduce its step size.
8 Conclusion
In this work we combine competitive gradient descent [13] and mirror descent [14] to obtain a
general algorithm for constrained competitive optimization. Our method uses ideas from information
geometry [15, 18, 19] to derive an update rule that incorporates the interaction between the players
and the nonlinear structure of the constraint set, while only solving a linear system of equations
at each iteration. There are numerous directions for future work including the development of a
convergence theory, using a multilinear local game to extend CMD to more than two players, and
studying its application to more general conic constraints.
8
Broader impact
This work proposes a basic optimization method and thus its societal impact is hard to predict. We
hope that by providing better tools for constrained optimization we can provide practitioners with
more flexibility in designing methods for reliable machine learning.
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A Simplifying constraints by duality
Constrained competitive optimization: The most general class of problems that we are concerned
with is of the form
min
x∈C,
f̃(x)∈C̃
f(x, y), min
y∈K,
g̃(y)∈K̃
g(x, y), (12)
where C ⊂ Rm,K ∈ Rn are convex sets, f̃ : C −→ Rñ and g̃ : K −→ Rm̃ are continuous
and piecewise differentiable multivariate functions of the two agents’ decision variables x and y
and C̃, K̃ are closed convex cones. This framework is extremely general and by choosing suitable
functions f̃ , g̃ and convex cones C̃, K̃ it can implement a variety of nonlinear equality, inequality,
and positive-definiteness constraints. While there are many ways in which a problem can be cast
into the above form, we are interested in the case where the f, f̃ , g, g̃ are allowed to be complicted,
for instance given in terms of neural networks, while the C̃, K̃ are simple and well-understood. For
convex constraints and objectives f and g the canonical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 8. A Nash equilibrium of Problem 12 is a pair of pair of feasible strategies (x̄, ȳ) such
that x̄ (ȳ) is the optimal strategy for x (y) given y = ȳ (x = x̄).
In the non-convex case it is less clear what should constitute a solution and it has been argued [16]
that meaningful solutions need not even be local Nash equilibria.
Lagrange multipliers for linear constraints: Using the classical technique of Lagrangian duality,
the complicated parameterization f, f̃ , g, g̃ and the simple constraints given by the C̃, K̃ can be further
decoupled. The polar of a convex cone K is defined as K◦ :=
{
y : supx∈K x
>y ≤ 0
}
. Using this
definition, we can rewrite Problem (12) as
min
x∈C,
µ∈K̃◦
f(x, y) + max
ν∈C̃◦
ν>f̃(x), min
y∈K,
ν∈C̃◦
g(x, y) + max
µ∈K̃◦
µ>g(y). (13)
Here we used the fact that the maxima are infinity if any constraint is violated and zero, otherwise.
Watchmen watching watchmen: We can now attempt to simplify the problem by making µj (νi)
decision variables of the y (x) player and adding a zero sum objective to the game that incentivizes
both players to enforce each other’s compliance with the constraints, resulting in
min
x∈C,
µ∈K̃◦
f(x, y) + ν>f̃(x)− µ>g̃(y), min
y∈K,
ν∈C◦
g(x, y) + µ>g̃(y)− ν>f̃(x). (14)
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Is there a relationship between the Nash equilibria of Problems (12) and (14)? It turns out that this
question can be studied in terms of two decoupled zero-sum games.
Lemma 2. A pair of points x̄, ȳ is a Nash equilibrium of Problem 12 if and only if x̄ and ȳ are
minimizers of
min
x∈C,
f̃(x)∈C̃
F (x), min
y∈K,
g̃(y)∈K̃
G(y), (15)
for F (x) := f(x, ȳ) and G(y) := g(x̄, y). Similarly, a pair of strategies (x̄, µ̄), (ȳ, ν̄) is a Nash
equilibrium of Problem 14 if and only if (x̄, ν̄), (ȳ, µ̄) are Nash equilibria of the decoupled zero sum
games
min
x∈C
max
ν∈C̃◦
F (x) + ν>f̃(x), min
y∈K
max
µ∈K̃◦
G(y) + µ>g̃(y). (16)
Proof. The first part of the Lemma follows directly from the Definition 8 of a Nash equilibrium. For
the second part we observe that (x̄, µ̄) ((ȳ, ν̄)) is an optimal strategy against (ȳ, ν̄) ((x̄, µ̄)) if and
only if x̄ (ȳ) minimizes F (G) over C (K) and µ̄ (ν̄) maximizes µ 7→ µ>g(ȳ) (ν 7→ ν>f(x̄)). But
this is exactly the definition of (x̄, ν̄) ((ȳ, µ̄)) being a Nash equilibrium of Problem 16.
While this result follows directly from the definition, it reduces the question to that of constrained
single-agent optimization, which has been studied extensively, allowing us to decuce the following
theorem. For convex, strictly feasible problems (“Slater’s condition”), we can show the equivalence
of Problems (12) and (14). In order to formulate these results in full generality, we need the following
definition.
Definition 9. We call a function f : K −→ Rn convex with respect to the cone C ⊂ Rn if
τf(x) + (1− τ) f(y)− f (τx+ (1− τ) y) ∈ C, ∀τ ∈ [0, 1], x, y ∈ K.
With this definition, we can formulate the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Assume that the following holds:
(i): f , f̃ , g, and g̃ are continuous.
(ii): f̃ (g̃) is convex with respect to −C̃ (−K̃).
(iii): For all ȳ ∈ K (x̄ ∈ C), F (G) as defined in Lemma 2 is convex.
(iv): For all x̄ ∈ C and ȳ ∈ K, the minimal values of Problem 15 are finite (not −∞).
(v): There exist (x, y) such that x ∈ int C, f̃(x) ∈ int C̃, y ∈ intK, g̃(y) ∈ int K̃.
Then, x̄ and ȳ are a Nash equilibrium of Problem (12) if and only if there exist ν̄ and µ̄ such that
(x̄, µ̄) and (ȳ, ν̄) are a Nash equilibrium of Problem (14).
Proof. By Lemma 2 it is enough to show that x̄ and ȳ are minimizers of Problem 15 if and only if
they can be complemented with Lagrange multipliers ν̄ and µ̄ to obtain Nash equilibria of Problem 16.
This result is shown, for instance, in [26][Chapter 3, Theorem 5.1].
A simplified problem: In the general non-convex setting, the relationship between Prob-
lems (12) and (14) is difficult to characterize. In this case, Problem (14) serves as an approximation
to Problem 12 that might be easier to solve. Techniques for closing the duality gap in single agent op-
timization, such as the addition of redundant constraints, can also serve to improve the approximation
of Problem (12) by Problem 14.
B Numerical implementation and experiments
Dual coordinate system for improved stability: In principle, either the primal, or the dual coor-
dinate system can be used to keep track of the running iterate. However, we observe that storing the
iterates in CGD in the dual coordinate system improves the numerical stability of the algorithm.
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When expressing the update direction in the dual coordinate system, the local problem reads
min
x∗∈Rm
[Dxf ]
[
D2ψ
]−1
x∗ + x∗,>
[
D2ψ
]−1 [
D2xyf
] [
D2φ
]−1
y∗ +
1
2
x∗,>
[
D2ψ
]−1
x∗
min
y∗∈Rn
[Dyg]
[
D2φ
]−1
y∗ + x∗,>
[
D2ψ
]−1 [
D2xyg
] [
D2φ
]−1
y∗ +
1
2
y∗,>
[
D2φ
]−1
y∗
,
where all derivatives are computed in the last iterate (xk, yk) Setting the derivatives with respect to
x∗ (y∗) to zero, we obtain
[Dxf ]
[
D2ψ
]−1
+
([
D2ψ
]−1 [
D2xyf
] [
D2φ
]−1
y∗
)>
+ x∗,>
[
D2ψ
]−1
= 0 (17)
[Dyg]
[
D2φ
]−1
+ x∗,>
[
D2ψ
]−1 [
D2xyg
] [
D2φ
]−1
+ y∗,>
[
D2φ
]−1
= 0 (18)
We plug these equation into each other, to obtain
[Dxf ]
[
D
2
ψ
]−1
−
([
Dyg
]
+ x
∗,>
[
D
2
ψ
]−1 [
D
2
xyg
]) [
D
2
φ
]−1 [
D
2
yxf
] [
D
2
ψ
]−1
+ x
∗,>
[
D
2
ψ
]−1
= 0
[
Dyg
] [
D
2
φ
]−1
−
(
[Dxf ] + y
∗,>
[
D
2
φ
]−1 [
D
2
yxf
]) [
D
2
ψ
]−1 [
D
2
xyg
] [
D
2
φ
]−1
+ y
∗,>
[
D
2
φ
]−1
= 0
Solving the above for x∗ and y∗, we obtain
x
∗
= −
([
D
2
ψ
]−1
−
[
D
2
ψ
]−1 [
D
2
xyf
] [
D
2
φ
]−1 [
D
2
yxg
] [
D
2
ψ
]−1)−1 ([
D
2
ψ
]−1
[Dxf ]
> −
[
D
2
ψ
]−1 [
D
2
xyf
] [
D
2
φ
]−1 [
Dyg
]>)
y
∗
= −
([
D
2
φ
]−1
−
[
D
2
φ
]−1 [
D
2
yxg
] [
D
2
ψ
]−1 [
D
2
xyf
] [
D
2
φ
]−1)−1 ([
D
2
φ
]−1
[Dxg]
> −
[
D
2
φ
]−1 [
D
2
yxg
] [
D
2
ψ
]−1
[Dxf ]
>
)
.
Once x∗ and y∗ have been computed, we can update the dual variables as xk+1 = xk + x∗ and
yk+1 = yk + y
∗.
Computing the updates in practice: Just like competitive gradient descent [13], CMD requires
the solution of a system of linear equations at each step. While this may seem prohibitively expensive
at first, [13, 16] show that CGD can be scaled to problems with millions of degrees of freedom. This
is achieved by using Krylov subspace methods such as the conjugate gradient or GMRES algorithms
[27] combined with mixed-mode automatic differentiation that allows to compute Hessian-vector
products almost as cheaply as gradients [28]. By using
[
D2ψ
]
and
[
D2φ
]
as a preconditioner, the
matrices that have to be inverted at each step are perturbations of the identity(
Id−
[
D2ψ
]− 12 [D2xyf] [D2φ]−1 [D2yxg] [D2ψ]− 12) (19)(
Id−
[
D2φ
]− 12 [D2yxg] [D2ψ]−1 [D2xyf] [D2φ]− 12) . (20)
As discusssed in [13], competing methods become unstable if the perturbations is large. If the
perturbation is small, conjugate gradient or GMRES algorithms converge quickly, resulting in
minimal overhead. [13] show that this adaptivity, together with the fact that CGD can use larger step
sizes, allows it to outperform competing methods even when fairly accounting for the cost of the
matrix inversion. The computational cost can be reduced further by using the solution of the linear
system in the last iteration as a warm start for the solution in the present iteration. Finally, we can see
from Equations 17 and 18 that once x∗ (y∗) has been computed, y∗ (x8) can be computed by only
inverting
[
D2φ
]
(
[
D2ψ
]
), which can often be done in closed form. Therefore we can alternatingly
invert the matrices in Equations 19 and 20, one at each iteration.
Numerical experiments: We will now provide numerical evidence for the practical performance
of CMD. The Julia-code for the numerical experiments presented here can be found under https:
//github.com/f-t-s/CMD. As discussed in Section 3 of the paper, naively combining cgd with
a projection step can result in convergence to spurious stable points even in convex problems, due
to the empty threats phenomenon. The same argument applies to all other methods described in
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Figure 7: CMW and PX applied to f(x, y) = α(x − 0.1)(y − 0.1) = −g(x, y) (α ∈
{0.1, 0.3, 0.9, 2.7}). For small α, PX converges faster but for large α it diverges.
[13][Section 3] as incuding a “competitive term”, with the exception of OGDA and the closely related
extragradient method. We believe that hte empty threats phenomenon rules out projected versions of
algorithms affected by it and therefore focus our numerical comparison on the projected extragradient
method (PX) of [24]. We also focus on the special case of CMW in this section, leaving a more
thorough exploration of other constraint sets and Bregman potentials to future work.
A first benefit of CMD is that it allows us to extend the robustness properties of CGD to conically
constrained problems. As discussed in [16], CGD is robust to strong interactions , without adjusting
its step size.
To showcase this property, we consider the simple bilinear zero-sum game f(x, y) = α(x− 0.1)(y−
0.1) = −g(x, y) with x and y constrained to lie in R+. While the projected extragradient method
converges faster for small α than CMD, we observes that the latter converges over the entire range of
values for α, whereas the extragradient method diverges as α gets too large (see Figure 6).
We now move to a high-dimensional example that will further showcase the advantages of combining
CGD with mirror descent. We consider the robust regression problem on the probability simplex
given by
min
x: x≥0, 1>x=1
‖Ax− b‖2 (21)
for A ∈ R50×5000, Aij ∼ N (0, Id) i. i. d., ε ∼ N (0, Id), and b = (A:,1 +A:,2)/2 + ε. In order to
enforce the normalization constraint 1>x = 1, we introduce a Lagrange multiplier y ∈ R and solve
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the competitive optimization problem given as
min
x∈R5000+
‖Ax− b‖2 + y(1>x− 1), min
y∈R
−y(1>x− 1). (22)
We use different inverse step sizes α ∈ {100, 1000} for x and β ∈ {1, 10, 100, 1000} for y and solve
the competitive optimization problem using CMW and PX. We then plot the loss incurred when
using x/1>x as a function of the number of iterations. The extragradient method stalled for all
step sizes that we tried, which is why we introduce extramirror (PXM), a mirror descent version of
extragradient that at each step uses the gradient computed in the next iteration of mirror descent to
perform a mirror descent update in the present iteration. As shown in Figure 8 CMW is the only
algorithm that converges over the entire range of α and β. The projected extragradient method always
stalls, while the extramirror algorithm diverges and produces NAN values for the largest step size.
Generally speaking, CMW converges faster for larger step sizes, while PXM converges faster for
smaller step sizes, as shown in Figure 8 Of course, to compare apples to apples we need to account for
the complexity of solving the matrix inverse in CMW. To this end, we show in Figure 9 the objectuve
value compared to the number of gradient computations and Hessian-vector products. Therefore,
each outer iteration of the extragradient and extramirror methods amounts to an x-axis value of 4,
while an outer iteration of CMW, where the conjugate gradient solver requires k steps, amounts to an
x-axis value of 4 + 2k.
Similar to [13], we observe that even when fairly accounting for the complexity of the matrix inverse,
CMW is competitive with PXM, beating it for larger step sizes, while being a bit slower for smaller
step sizes. Importantly, it is significantly more robust and converges even in settings where the
competing methods diverge.
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Figure 8: We plot the objective value in Equation 21 (after normalization of x) compared to outer
iterations. In the first panel, PXM diverges and produces NAN values, which is why the plot is
incomplete
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Figure 9: We plot the objective value in Equation 21 (after normalization of x) compared to the
number of gradient computations and Hessian-vector products, accounting for the inner loop of
CMW.
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